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FUZZYLOGICAND THE SLIDING
SCALETHEOREM
Frederic L. Kirgis*
[Mlost legal problems end as questions of degree.'
The law operates principally in the context of ordinary transactions
and relationships. Consequently it is important to develop insights into
how it operates in the everyday world. To resolve recurring legal issues
in everyday affairs, judges and other decision-makers sometimes use
formulas. When a legal formula contains two elements, as several do, a
process of fuzzy logic produces a result that is a function of a sliding
scale between the elements. Thus, if physical presence in a new state +
intent to remain = change of domicile, there will be degrees of each
element, such that the degree of physical presence (which could be
treated as a fraction between zero and one or as a point on a diagram
where each of two axes runs from zero to one) combines with the degree of intent to remain, to produce a result-either acquisition of a
new domicile or retention of the old one. The process and the result is
best illustrated by a diagram that, in most instances, resembles an
economist's demand curve. The placement and slope of the curve will
depend on the particular formula, and the curve may shift depending on
what is at stake. The process is at work in several fields of law including contracts, civil procedure and conflict of laws.

I.

INTRODUCTION
A. The Theorenz
B. Fuzzy Logic

Law School Association Alumni Professor, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. I am grateful to my research assistant, Aaron Shumway, for his excellent work throughout
the preparation of this Article, and to my colleague, Lewis H. LaRue, for introducing me to the
literature of fuzzy logic.
1.
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948) (Douglas, J.).

'
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C. An Example
11. CONTRACT
ISSUES
A. Liquidated Damages Clauses
B. Unconscionability
111. PROCEDURAL
ISSUES
A. Preliminary Injunctions
B. Personal Jurisdiction
1V. CONFLICTOF LAWSISSUES (OTHER THAN LONG ARM
JURISDICTION)
A. Change of Domicile
B. Choice of Law in Tort and Contract Cases
V. CONCLUSION

A. The Theorem

Legal norms and procedures provide structure for the ordinary
transactions and relationships that persons enter into and play out each
day. Over time, the structure tends to become formulaic, containing
two or more elements. The elements may be facts (objective or subjective) or they may be reflections of value judgments (for example, judgments about what is or is not fair). Each element is said to be either
present or missing. According to the typical two-element formula, if
elements a and b are both present, and only if both are present, a given
legal result is ~ b t a i n e d That
. ~ the formula says so does not necessarily
make it so. The premise of this Article is that in practice it oftenperhaps usually-is not so. The premise is most readily illustrated by
focusing on formulas that are limited to, or are dominated by, just two
elements and that consequently can be diagramed in two dimensions.
At least in the fields to be examined in this Article, the fulfillment
of each stated element is a matter of degree and the attainment or nonattainment of the legal result emanates from a sliding scale reflecting
the degree to which each of the two elements has been satisfied. The
sliding scale theorem may be simply stated: The greater the degree to
which one element is satisfied, the lesser the degree to which the other
2.
To give an example that will be developed later in this Article, if a person (a) has some
physical presence in a new state, and (b) demonstrates an intent to live there indefinitely, he or
she has established a new domicile. Some legal formulas have more than two elements. but the
focus here is on those cases in which there are only two stated elements, or those in which two
elements are dominant even though there may also be some subsidiary ones. The present study
deals with civil proceedings and civil responsibility, as distinguished from criminal law.
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need be. The challenge is to demonstrate that it is at work in practice,
and to show how it operates. This may be done by examining cases in
discrete fields of law. The fields investigated here are sufficiently representative to suggest that the sliding scale theorem may apply to a
wide variety of dual-element formulas in the law.3
Sometimes courts and other decision-makers recognize that they are
using such a sliding scale;4 more often, they do not recognize it or, in
any event, do not articulate it.5 An unarticulated use of a sliding scale
frequently appears from the decision-makers' emphasis on only one of
the elements while lip service is given to the other, or from their
strained efforts to demonstrate that both elements have been met.6

B. Fuzzy Logic
The sliding scale principle may be seen as a manifestation of fuzzy
logic, which holds that everything temporal can be a matter of degree.'
Under fuzzy logic, zero and one are simply the opposite ends of a cont i n ~ u m .Although
~
some phenomena reflect true dichotomies ("crisp
sets"), a great deal of what we can observe falls along a scale between
the true extremes or falls in a set with inherently fuzzy bo~ndaries.~
Thus, what we think of as a full glass (a glass filled to a level just far
enough below the rim to prevent spillage in ordinary use) is a ninety
percent full glass and a ten percent empty glass. A game won at the
expense of an injury to a key player is a game eighty percent won and
twenty percent lost. As one text has put it:

I have demonstrated the sliding scale concept elsewhere, as it relates to two discrete
3.
areas of international law. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 146 (1987); Frederic L. Kirgis. The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era.
88 AM. J . INT'L L. 304 (1994). Some other legal scholars have used the concept without
identifying a broad theorem. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future
of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 852 (1999); William M. Richman, Pan 11-A
Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction. 72 CAL.
L. REV. 1328. 1336-46 (1984). The present Article widens the scope of the inquiry without
revisiting international law.
See, e.g., Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
4.
1985) (referring to a "balancing approach" requiring a "certain quantum of procedural plus a
certain quantum of substantive unconscionabilityn).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Elson, 458 N.E.2d 637 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (balancing factors
5.
in change of domicile case without articulating the use of a sliding scale).
See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom.
6.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001) (No. 00-1293); Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc.,
907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995).
See, e.g., BART KOSKO. FUZZY THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF FUZZY LOGIC 18
7.
(1993); DANIEL MCNEILL & PAUL FREIBERGER,
FUZZY LOGIC 12 (1993).
KOSKO. supra note 7. at 18.
8.
See MARTINGARDNER,
WEIRD WATER& FUZZY LOGIC 158 (1996); GEORGE J. KLIR&
9.
TINA A. FOLGER,FUZZY SETS, UNCERTAINTY.
AND INFORMATION 3 (1988).
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Temperature, distance, beauty, friendliness, greenness, pleasure-all come on a sliding scale. The Canadian Rockies are very
beautiful. My next-door neighbor is fairly lazy. Boston is quite
close to Cape Cod. Likewise, objects are objects to degrees.
Astronomers say Jupiter is a star to a weak extent. Egypt was
partly a colony of Britain; the United States was largely one. A
dagger is very much a weapon, while a curtain rod is scarcely a
weapon at all. Such sliding scales often make it impossible to
distinguish members of a class from nonmembers. When does a
hill become a mountain, or a pond a lake? How far is far?''
Fuzzy logic in its full regalia is much more splendid than this." For
purposes of developing a sliding scale theorem, however, we need only
accept that in the observable world, hot and cold, or fast and slow, are
not absolutes. There are degrees of "hotness" and "coldness." We are
dealing, in other words, with fuzzy sets.
Nor do we need to accept fuzzy logic in every corner of human existence in order to accept it for much of what can be observed; in particular, we need not necessarily accept it as ubiquitous in order to find
it at work in the law. Indeed, we might expect to find it especially in
the law, since so many legal concepts and doctrines have fuzzy boundaries. Consider, for example, the technique (though not the language) of
fuzzy logic in the classic two-part article written by Lon L. Fuller and
William R. Perdue, Jr., in the 1930s, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages.12 Fuller and Perdue attacked the then-prevailing view that a
promise is either contractual-in which case expectancy damages are to
be awarded for a breach-or it is not contractual-in which case no
damages should be awarded.13 Professor Fuller later said, "I consider
the contribution made in my article on the reliance interest to lie, not in
calling attention to the reliance interest itself, but in an analysis which
breaks down the contract-no contract dichotomy, and substitutes an ascending scale of enforceability. "I4
As all students of the law know, fuzziness inheres in the law of
property as well. According to a leading treatise, "[t]itle, as all propMCNEILL& FREIBERGER,
supra note 7, at 12.
See Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert ReaL. REV.1243, 1289-99, 1324-30 (1999).
soning, F m y Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND.
12. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue. Jr.. The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I . 46
YALEL.J. 52 (1936) [hereinafter Reliance Interest I ] ; L.L. Fuller &William R. Perdue, Jr.. The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 2: 46 YALEL.J. 373 (1937) [hereinafter Reliance Interest
10.
11.

-

21
13.
14.

Reliance Interest 2, supra note 12, at 418-20.
Letter from Lon L. Fuller, Professor, Duke University School of Law, to Karl N. Llewellyn, Professor, Columbia University School of Law (Dec. 8, 1938), reprinted in ROBERT S.
SUMMERS
& ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT
AND RELATEDOBLIGATION: THEORY. DOCTRINE,
AND PRACTICE
41 (4th ed. 2001).
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erty rights, is a relative concept. A person may have 'title' to property
as against one person but not another."" Nor is fuzziness limited to
mundane areas of the law. Faced with the problem of deciding whether
it had admiralty jurisdiction over salvage rights to the R.M.S. Titanic
lying 400 miles off the coast of Newfoundland in 12,500 feet of water,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit came up with the concept of
"shared sovereignty" by which it asserted "imperfect" in rem jurisdiction over the wreck, even though it recognized that admiralty tribunals
in other countries might do so too.I6
The United States Supreme Court has endorsed fuzziness as well.
Declining to review the impeachment conviction of a federal judge, the
Supreme Court said:
A controversy is nonjusticiable-i.e., involves a political
question-where there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . ." [Tlhe concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely
separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially
manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there
is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate
branch. l7
The questions to be examined here are whether we can find fuzzy
logic at work in dual-element formulas across selected fields of the law,
and if so, how it operates in those fields. If it is indeed at work, it
should not only supply an interesting theorem about how the law works;
it should also help us predict how cases within its ambit will be decided. No claim is made that it is a precise predictive tool; just that it is
itelpful in those situations where it operates.
C. An Example

To give an example that will be developed more fully below, it is
generally said that for a person to acquire a new domicile, there must
be (a) a voluntary physical presence in the new state, and (b) an intent
to make a home there." In practice, the more attached the physical
p

p

p

p

p

-

15. RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAWOF PROPERTY:
AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY
1 (4th
ed. 1991).
16. R.M.S. Titanic. Inc. v. Haver. 171 F.3d 943, 967-69 (4th Cir. 1999).
17. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)) (citations omitted).
OF LAWS $8 15-18 (1971).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT

426

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 53:2:421

presence, the less exacting the decision-maker will be regarding a
showing of intent (though some showing of intent will still be required).Ig The reverse is also true: the clearer the intent to remain indefinitely, the less connected to the new territory the presence must
be.*'
The sliding scale between these two elements may be illustrated by
what looks like an economist's demand curve. The precise location and
slope of the curve will shift depending on the ultimate issue to which
the person's change of domicile is relevant, but the sliding scale principle is at work no matter what the ultimate issue is. In the diagram, the
vertical axis represents the extent to which the person has established a
physical presence in the new state. The horizontal axis represents the
extent of the person's demonstrated resolve to put down roots there.
The further up on the vertical axis, the more settled the person is in the
new state; at the top, the person would be fully (100%) settled there.
The further to the right on the horizontal axis, the clearer the resolve to
stay; at the far right end, the person would be absolutely certain (at that
moment) that he or she will stay there for a lifetime.
Figure 1

Extent of
physical
presence in I
new state I ,

I\

Domicile
changed

B\

A

- L A
?
1

'

\

1

I

I
I

\,
',.

i

Extent of demonstrated resolve to stay

19.

20.

See discussion infra Part 1V.A.
See discussion infra Part 1V.A.
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At any point along either axis, relevant factual influences are in
play to some degree. Thus, at any point along the horizontal axis, such
factors as the likely duration of the person's employment in the state,
the extent of the person's tolerance of (or preference for) the physical
characteristics of the area (e.g., mountains, seashore, climate, air quality) and the availability of amenities (e. g., sporting events, theaters,
shopping) are in combination to form a fuzzy set. At the origin of an
axis, there is an "empty set;" at the end of an axis, there is a "total set"
for that axis."
Within the constraint "that an object's degrees of membership in
complementary groups must sum to unity"22 (i.e., must total one on a
scale of zero to one, or 100% on a scale of zero percent to 100%) fuzzy
logic is intentionally imprecise. Thus, in the diagram, very often the
location of a point on either axis is more a matter of judgment than of
precise observation. Consequently the diagrams used throughout this
Article cannot be used as a bright-line predictor of outcomes in particular cases. Rather, the diagrams illustrate what is actually going on, in a
form that has been simplified enough to be manageable, yet sufficiently
focused on the relevant factors to be meaningful to students and practitioners of the law.
In Figure 1 above, any combination of established physical presence
and a demonstrated resolve to remain that falls above the curve (e.g., at
the intersection of the two dotted lines at point A) results in a change of
domicile to the new state; any combination below the curve (as at point
B) leaves the domicile unchanged. Point B would represent, for example, a person in the military who has been assigned to a relatively longterm duty station in a new state, but who has not demonstrated any real
intent to stay once the military service is completed.
The fields selected for examination here are basic to the law. This
Article will examine how the principle applies and adapts itself to discrete issues of contract law, civil procedure and conflict of laws.=

A. Liquidated Damages Clauses
According to the current Restatement of Contracts, a liquidated
--

See Bart Kosko & Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, SCI. AM., July 1993, at 76, 80 (illustrat21.
ing this concept in a non-legal context).
22. Id. at 76.
Other fruitful areas of further inquiry include international law, see supra note 3, and
23.
constitutional criminal procedure. See United States v. Chaidez. 919 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1990)
(applying a sliding scale approach to determine the constitutionality of searches and seizures).
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damages clause in a contract is enforceable, "but only at an amount that
is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the
breach and the difficulties of proof of 1 0 ~ s . Although
"~~
this is stated as
a reasonableness test consisting of two independent elements-(a) the
anticipated or actual loss (either one will normally suffice), and (b) the
difficulty of proving a loss-the Restatement's comment makes it clear
that the two elements are interdependent:
A determination whether the amount fixed is a penalty turns on
a combination of these two factors. If the difficulty of proof of
loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other hand, the difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that
appro~imation.~'
The common law cases bear this out, though they do not all say so.
However, at least one state Supreme Court has been quite explicit. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has said in a case involving a liquidated
damages clause in an employment contract that there are three factors
in determining the validity of the clause.26It said the first-whether the
parties intended to provide for damages or for a penalty-was rarely
helpf~l.~'
The other two were the traditional ones. The court said:
The second factor-the "difficulty of ascertainment" testassists in determining the reasonableness of the clause. The
greater the difficulty of ascertaining damages due to breach, the
more probable it is that the stipulated damages are reasonable. .

....
The third factor-does the clause represent a reasonable
forecast of harm caused by the breach-is intertwined with the
second factor.28
When the liquidated amount in a contract is reasonable in light of
either the anticipated or actual loss, as it was in the Wisconsin case, the
courts pay little attention to the difficulty of ascertaining damages, at
least if it is not an adhesion ~ontract.~'
When the loss would be quite
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
5 356(1) (1981).
Id. at cmt. b.
Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 377 N.W.2d 593. 600 (Wis. 1985).
27. Koenings, 377 N.W.2d at 600.
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. See id.; see also Farmers Export Co. v. MIV Georgis Prois, 799 F.2d 159 (5th Cir.
1986); Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 435 A.2d 1022 (Conn. 1980); Taos Constr. Co. v. Penzel
Constr. Co.. 750 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. App. 1988); Truck Rent-A-Center. Inc. v. Puritan Farms
2nd. Inc., 361 N.E.2d 1015 (N.Y. 1977).

24.
25.
26.
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difficult to ascertain in advance, the courts are inclined to uphold a liquidated damages clause without close examination of reasonablenesseven of reasonableness with the benefit of hind~ight.~'In practice, however, the reasonableness element is likely to weigh more heavily in the
equation than is the difficulty-of-ascertainment element.31
The analysis under article 2 of the U.C.C. is essentially the same.
Section 2-718(1) puts forth three elements for a valid liquidated damages clause-the two we have been considering, plus "the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."32
Professor Hawkland says that the three stated elements are simply factors to consider in determining whether a liquidated damages clause is
r e a ~ o n a b l e The
. ~ ~ third element, he says, probably illustrates a common
situation that falls under the second element relating to the difficulty of
proof of loss; otherwise, it is difficult to understand what purpose it
serves.34 Hawkland adds that, contrary to his earlier view, it is not necessary to satisfy each of the elements; instead, they are indicators of
reas~nableness.~'The cases under section 2-718(1) tend to use the
common law approach-the sliding scale.36
As one would expect, courts are likely to shift the sliding scale to
require a greater degree of compliance with the variable elements when
the liquidated damages clause appears in an adhesion contract. A court
may strike down a liquidated damages clause in an adhesion contract as
unconscionable if it does not closely approximate the anticipated or
actual damages (without much or any reference to the difficulty of
proof of 10s~)~'
or the court may simply apply stricter scrutiny to each
of the two traditional elements than courts normally do when a contract,
30. See, e.g., Yockey v. Horn, 880 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1989); Better Food Mkts v. Am.
Dist. Tel. Co.. 253 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1953); Growney v. CMH Real Estate Co., 238 N.W.2d 240
(Neb. 1976). If the actual damage turns out to be zero, some courts will decline to enforce a
clause liquidating damages at a substantial sum, even if it was a reasonable estimate of difficultto-determine damages as of the date of the contract. See Colonial at Lynnfield, Inc. v. Sloan, 870
F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1989); accord RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
8 356 cmt. b (1981)
(calling this an "extreme case"). But see Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114. 1116-17 (Mass.
1999).
& JOSEPH M. PERILLO,THE LAWOFCONTRACTS
591-92 (4th
31. See JOHN D. CALAMARI
CONTRACTS
844-47 (3d ed. 1999).
ed. 1998); E. ALLANFARNSWORTH,
32. U.C.C. 5 2-718(1) (2000).
CODE SERIES 8 2-718:2 (1998); see
33. 2 WILLtAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
also Roy Ryden Anderson, Liquidated Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 SW.
L.J. 1083, 1092 (1988).
supra note 33. 5 2-718:4.
34. HAWKLAND,
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Grumman Flexible Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 505 F. Supp. 623 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden. 363 A.2d 270 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Chien v.
Tova Realty. 573 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1991); Baker v. Int'l Record Syndicate. Inc.,
812 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 1091.
CODE163-64 (5th
37. See JAMESJ. WHITE& ROBERTS. SUMMERS,UNIFORMCOMMERCIAL
ed. 2000) and cases cited therein.
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or at least the liquidated damages clause, is subject to n e g o t i a t i ~ nAs
.~~
one state supreme court has put it, "courts are beginning to look with
favor upon stipulated damage provisions between parties who have
equality of opportunity for understanding and insisting upon their
rights."39 The implication, of course, is that courts will look with less
favor on these provisions when there is no such equality of opportun i ~ . ~
In the diagram below, the curve shifts to the northeast when the
terms of the liquidated damages clause are non-negotiable. The diagram
relates only to liquidated damages clauses, as distinguished from
clauses limiting consequential damages.
Figure 2

Proximity to J!
mountof
anticipated j 7
oractual
14 \
damages
,1 4
!k
1
\>

! . i s',
I
'.

.

i

I
I

y*

'.

\'\

x.,

.,

Clause valid

‘-

t

I

i

1:

i

Difficulty of proof or ascertainment
In Figure 2, the lower curve (K-1) is the validation curve for a liquidated damages clause in a negotiated (or at least a negotiable) contract. The upper curve (K-2) represents a contract containing a non38. See, e.g., H.J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 55 A.2d 793 (Md. 1947); Lee Oldsmobile, 363
A.2d at 274-76; Chien, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 857-58.
39. Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 770 (Okla. 1965) (quoted with approval in
Charles J . Goetz & Robert E. Scott. Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 554, 593 n.104 (1977)).
40. See Weber v. Riviera. 841 P.2d 534, 537-38 (Mont. 1992) (citing Waggoner and striking
down a rigid liquidated damages clause in a form contract).
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negotiable liquidated damages clause. The curves approach the vertical
axis more closely than they do the horizontal axis, reflecting the courts'
greater inclination to uphold a clause relatively high on the proximity
scale and relatively low on the difficulty-of-ascertainment scale than
vice-versa.
Any combination of the two relevant factors that intersects below
the K-1 curve (as at point A) would lead a court not to enforce even a
negotiated clause; any combination that intersects above the K-2 curve
(as at point B) would be upheld, even if the clause was non-negotiable.
An intersection between the curves (as at point C) would result in upholding a negotiated or negotiable clause, but striking down a nonnegotiable one.
Point C represents an actual case, H.J. McGrath Co. v. Wi~ner.~'
A
cannery agreed to buy about eleven tons of tomatoes from a farmer during the growing season at an agreed price, and had the farmer sign its
standard form ~ontract.~'
The contract contained a clause setting liquidated damages at $300 if the farmer breached.43Although the clause on
its face was applicable no matter how early or late in the season the
farmer breached, experience showed that farmers were likely to breach
fixed-price contracts, if at all, late in the season when supply became
scarce and spot market prices rose.44 The $300 figure was tailored to
such a prospective breach.45 The farmer did breach late in the season,
causing the cannery actual damages of $275.46 The court rejected the
liquidated damages clause because it could have been invoked even if
the farmer had breached earlier in the season when the stipulated
amount would have been considerably in excess of the actual damage^.^'
A negotiated clause surely would have been upheld.48

B.

Unconscionability

The unconscionability doctrine, codified for the sale of goods in
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302,49 extends beyond that genre
41. 55 A.2d 793 (Md. 1947).
42. Wisner. 55 A.2d at 794.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 794-95.
45. Id. at 795.
46. Id. at 796.
47. Wisner, 55 A.2d at 796.
383-84 (2d ed. 1964) (espousing an
48. See 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
outcome inconsistent with Wisner, without distinguishing between adhesion and non-adhesion
L.Q.
contracts); see also Ian R. Macneil. Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies. 47 CORNELL
495, 511-13 (1962).
49. U.C.C. 5 2-302(1) (2000). The U.C.C. states:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
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to consumer contracts of all sorts, and even on occasion to contracts
between commercial parties.50 Its classic statement appears in Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., where Judge J. Skelly Wright identified the following two elements: absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one party, and terms unreasonably favorable to the other party."
The former element is often characterized by "bargaining naughtiness"
by a party with greatly superior bargaining power.52 The latter element
is generally characterized by very harsh terms in the ~ontract.'~The
two elements have come to be known respectively as procedural and
substantive uncon~cionability.~~
Several commentators have pointed out that a sliding scale has been
used between procedural and substantive unconscionability, particularly
when the abuse in one category-procedural or (especially) substantive-is p r o n ~ u n c e d .Nevertheless,
~~
one leading commentator asserts,
without recognizing a sliding scale, that the conduct must be unconscionable in both the procedural and substantive aspects. He concedes
that there have been a few exceptions, but he does not seem to recognize degrees of procedural and substantive unconscionability.56 The
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
50. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS5 208 (1979) (tracking U.C.C. section 2302 almost verbatim, without limiting it to sales of goods or to consumer contracts). The Reporter's Note to section 208 says that it follows U.C.C. section 2-302. See also CALAMARI
&
PERILLO,supra note 31, at 370-71; 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
5 1 8 5 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter WILLISTON].
51. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
52. See Williams. 350 F.2d at 449. Professor Leff appears to have coined the phrase. "bargaining naughtiness." See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485.487 (1967).
53. See 1 WHITE& SUMMERS,supra note 37, at 156. Sometimes the second element is
stated in terms of unreasonable allocation of risks in the contract. See also A & M Produce Co.
v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating the second element in
terms of unreasonable allocation of risks in the contract); American Software. Inc. v. Ali. 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating the second element as a bargain so unequal
as to shock the conscience).
54. See Leff, supra note 52, at 487-88.
55. See 1 WHITE& SUMMERS,supra note 37, at 168-69; WILLISTON,supra note 50, 8
18:14; John A. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems. 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931. 95051. 968 (1969); see also Jonathan A. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies:
The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REV. 28, 42 n.56 (1977).
supra note 33, 5 2-302.5. The first case Hawkland cites for the
56. See 1 HAWKLAND,
proposition that both elements must be satisfied is NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d
769 (Ga. 1996). But the Georgia Supreme Court said in that case:
Research supports the statement made in Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda. [464
So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)], that '[mlost courts take a "balancing
approach" to the unconscionability question, and to tip the scales in favor of unconscionability, most courts seem to require a certain quantum of procedural plus a
certain quantum of substantive unconscionability.'
NEC Techs., Znc., 478 S.E.2d at 773 n.6. This, of course, is an application of the slid-
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cases do not support him. Some courts have acknowledged using a sliding scale in unconscionability cases;" others do it sub silentio when the
abuse in one category is too much to ignore."
In the diagram below, as in Figure 2, there are two curves. The
lower curve (K-3) applies to consumer contracts. The upper curve (K-4)
applies to contracts between commercial parties. The K-4 curve reflects
the greater leeway courts give to seemingly one-sided commercial contract provisions than they do to one-sided provisions in consumer contracts. Both curves approach the horizontal axis more closely than the
vertical, reflecting the courts' tendency to find unconscionability on the
basis of extremely one-sided terms even if there is little evidence of
bargaining naughtiness.
Figure 3
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ing scale theorem.
57. See Hellstrom v. North Slope Borough, 797 P 3 d 1192. 1200 (Alaska 1990); Carboni v.
Arrospide. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845. 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Fotomat Corp. v. Chanda. 464 So. 2d
626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 773 n.6 (Ga.
1996); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 635 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979); State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131. 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
58. Included among these cases are those finding unconscionability on the basis of lopsided
terms in the contract (i.e.. extreme cases in which the sliding scale tips overwhelmingly toward
substantive unconscionability). See. e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz. 172 F.2d 80. 83-84 (3d
Cir. 1948); Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs.. Inc.. 907 P.2d 51. 59 (Ariz. 1995); Am. Home
Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 889 (N.H. 1964).
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Point A in Figure 3 represents the leading case, Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture CO.~'Walker-Thomas sold a stereo set on credit to a
woman on welfare, knowing that she was a single mother with seven
children.@'
A "rather obscure provision" in the contract provided that
her payments would be spread pro rata among all the items p~rchased.~'
This meant that a balance would remain due (and a lien would remain
imposed) on every item she had purchased until she paid the full balance due on all items.62There was no indication that the price charged
for the stereo set or any of the other items was excessive.63 The trial
court condemned the furniture company's business practices, but
thought that it could not hold the contract unconscionable under the
common law of the District of ~ o l u m b i a The
. ~ ~ Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that there were adequate grounds upon which the trial court might find uncon~cionability.~
The harshness of the pro rata payment clause entered into the decision,
but the lack of any indication of exorbitant pricing would keep the relevant point on the horizontal axis from being far to the right. The court
seems to have given considerable weight to the company's apparent
misuse of its superior bargaining power.66
Point B illustrates Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, I ~ c .A~ '
door-to-door salesman sold the plaintiff a solar home water heater for
$6,512.68Ten-year financing at 19.5 % interest brought the total cost to
almost $15,000.69 Under the security terms of the contract, in the event
of a default the seller not only could repossess the water heater, but
also could foreclose on the purchaser's modest home.70 Reversing the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that unconscionability can be established with a
showing of substantive unconscionability alone (although the opinion
also suggests that the court suspected some degree of procedural unconscionability).71
Point C reflects the holding in Ilkhchooyi v. BestYna commercial
59. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
60. William, 350 F.2d at 448.
61. Id. at 447.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 447-48.
64. Id. at 448. The U.C.C. had not been enacted in the District of Columbia at the time of
the transaction. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 448.
65. Id. at 450.
66. Id.
67. 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995).
68. Marwell, 907 P.2d at 53.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 53-54.
71. See id. at 59. Point B in Figure 3 also illustrates the other cases cited supra note 58.
72. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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contract case. Plaintiff bought a dry cleaning business from third parties and took a sublease of the premises.73 The sublease was terminated
before its term expired, when the sublessors went bankrupt.74 At that
point the lessor, a management company, sent the plaintiff a new lease
which contained prominent terms increasing the security deposit and
adding the wife of the plaintiff's business partner as a lessee.75 When
the plaintiff objected to these two changes, the lessor allowed him to
delete his business partner's wife's name as a lessee, but declined to
make any other changes.76The lessor's representative assured the plaintiff that in other respects the new lease was basically the same as the
terminated ~ u b l e a s e In
. ~ fact, unnoticed by the plaintiff at the time, it
contained a new paragraph 14c that gave the lessor the right to withhold
its consent to any transfer of the leasehold unless the plaintiff paid it
three-quarters of any compensation he might receive for a covenant not
to compete with the purchaser of the bu~iness.~'
When the plaintiff sold
the business and attempted to assign the lease to the buyer, the lessor
demanded $30,000 of the $40,000 he was to receive from the buyer for
his covenant not to compete.79 The court struck down paragraph 14c,
citing both procedural and substantive uncons~ionability.~~
The court
conceded that the procedural infirmities were not overwhelming, but,
expressly applying a sliding scale, found the profit-sharing clause suffiPoint C,
ciently unfair to tip the balance in favor of uncons~ionability.~~
in other words, was placed far enough to the right to be above even the
K-4 (commercial contract) curve.

A.

Preliminary Injunctions

"The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction," the
United States Supreme Court has said, "requires the plaintiff to show
that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury and
also that he is likely to prevail on the merit^."'^ This, of course, is a
two-factor test. However, in the same opinion the Supreme Court said
Ilkhchooyi, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id.
Ilkchooyi, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769.
Id.
Id. at 775-76.
Id. at 775.
Doran v. Salem Inn. Inc.. 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
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that a district court must weigh the interests on both sides.83 On the
surface, that supplies a third factor. Treatises and several cases add a
fourth: the public interest.84 Sometimes this fourth factor is stated as
non-party interests, which could be simply the private interests of a
relatively small group of non-parties.85
In cases directly involving constitutional claims, federal statutes or
regulations that embody a clearly identifiable public policy, the public
interest factor is often stressed-sometimes to the exclusion of the other
factors,86but not always.87In a recent case involving freedom of speech
on the Internet, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
granting of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the federal
Child Online Protection
relying heavily on the plaintiff's likelihood of successfully challenging the act on the merits." The court gave
cursory treatment to the other factors, relegating the public interest
factor to a single paragraph at the end of the opinion.g0 And in the
highly-publicized Napster case involving a copyright infringement challenge to the use of a popular internet site for free downloading and uploading of music, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
subject to some modification, the District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction based on a combination of the plaintiffs' likelihood of
success on the merits and a balancing of hardships in their favor.g1The
public interest was barely menti~ned.'~
In the typical lawsuit between private parties, where no prominent
statute or deep-seated public policy is at the heart of the case, the public interest factor is unlikely to be important. Nor are private non-party
interests important unless one of the parties asserts them and they are
legally protected interests that are likely to be affected by the litigation
in some concrete manner.93The discussion below is limited to cases in
which the public interest and legally protected non-party interests are
83. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931.
84. See 11A CHARLES ALANWRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
8 2948
(2d ed.1995) and cases cited therein. See also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE
INJURY
RULE118 (1991).
85. See Laura W. Stein, The Court and the Community: Why Non-Party Interests Should
Count in Preliminary Injunction Actions, 16 REV. LITIG.27 (1997).
86. See 1lA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 84, 8 2948.4.
87. See, e.g., Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 456 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.
1972) (involving the Sherman Act); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d
Cir. 1953) (involving the Clayton Act).
88. 47 U.S.C. 5 231 (West Supp. 2000).
89. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001).
90. ACLU v. Reno. 217 F.3d at 180.
91. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013, 1019, 1022, 1024, 1025
(9th Cir. 2001).
92. See id. at 1028 (addressing briefly Napster's First Amendment argument).
93. See Stein. supra note 85. at 31-32, 50-55.
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absent or too marginal to be included in the formula.94
Irreparable injury and the balancing of interests may be regarded as
a single factor.95 In practice, "irreparable" injury to the moving party is
simply a fuzzy set where the harm to the interests of the moving party,
if the preliminary injunction is denied, is likely to outweigh the harm to
the interests of the resisting party if the injunction is granted. We are
left with a sliding scale between the balance of hardships, on one hand,
and the likelihood of success on the merits, on the other. As Judge
Richard Posner has put it:
If the plaintiff does show some likelihood of success, the
court must then determine how likely that success is, because
this affects the balance of relative harms . . . . The more likely
the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of
harms weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more
need it weigh in his favor. This is a most important principle,
and one well supported by cases in this and other circuits, and
by scholarly commentary.%
If the case does not significantly affect the public interest, the sliding scale diagram for issuance of a preliminary injunction takes the
form of Figure 4 below.

94. In a number of cases, courts have felt compelled to mention the public interest factor,
but have treated it cursorily or have said that it was not important on the facts of the case. See.
e.g., Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1121 (7" Cir. 1997);
J.E. Hanger, Inc. v. Scussel, 937 F. Supp. 1546, 1556-57 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Sluiter v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 979 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (E.D. Mich. 1997); La Calhtne,
Inc. v. Spolyar. 938 F. Supp. 523. 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1984).
95.
96.
Roland Mach. Co., 749 F.2d at 387 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Posner's approach was
based on a balancing model set forth in John Leubsdorf. The Standard for Preliminary Injuncrionr, 91 HARV.L. REV. 525, 540-48 (1978). Judge Posner articulated his approach mathematically in Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prod. Lid., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1986). but
the mathematics may have proved too daunting for trial judges. See, e.g., Cleveland Hair Clinic.
Inc. v. Puig, 968 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The wording of the sliding scale formula differs somewhat among the federal circuits. See, e.g.. Amazon.com. Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.. 239 F.3d 1343. 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Brenntag Int'l Chems.. Inc. v. Bank of
India, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999); Williams v. State Univ. of New York, 635 F. Supp.
1243, 1250 (E.D. N.Y. 1986). For other sliding scale cases, see Duct-0-Wire Co. v. U.S.
Crane, Inc.. 31 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Corp.. 833
F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1987); Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997); United
States v. Any & All Assets of Shane Co., 816 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. N.C. 1991); Dixon v.
Thatcher, 742 P.2d 1029 (Nev. 1987); Penn v. Transp. Lease Hawaii, Ltd., 630 P.2d 646 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1981. See also Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for Preliminary Injunctions. 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 870-84 (1989) (advocating a balancing test without
fully accepting Judge Posner's approach).
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Figure 4
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Extent to which hm to movhg party exceeds harm to
resisting party
It has been pointed out that likelihood of success, like irreparable
harm, is not a simple prop~sition.~'
Not only are there degrees of likelihood, but there may be a question about what constitutes success-a
fuzzy set. For example, there may be a strong likelihood of partial succ e ~ s In
. ~such
~ a case, the vertical axis in the diagram may be regarded
as a measure of the likelihood that the moving party will succeed in
obtaining satisfactory relief, even if it is not the full relief the complaint
sought.
Point zero, at the intersection of the vertical and horizontal axes, is
the point on the horizontal axis at which the harm to the moving party,
if the preliminary injunction is not granted, is equivalent to the harm to
the resisting party if the injunction is granted. The harm to the moving
party exceeds that to the resisting party by greater degrees as we proceed to the right on the horizontal axis.
The preliminary injunction curve touches the top of the vertical axis
(point A), indicating that very high likelihood of total success may well
induce the court to grant the injunction even when the harm to the mov97. See LAYCOCK.supra note 84. at 120.
98. See id.
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ing party, if it is not granted, would be no greater than the harm to the
resisting party if the injunction is granted." The curve does not touch
the horizontal axis, indicating that there must be at least some prospect
of success if the preliminary injunction is to be granted.''' This is so
even if the moving party can show serious harm in the absence of the
injunction and the resisting party can show little or no harm if the injunction is issued (point B). Nevertheless, if the moving party makes a
considerably stronger showing of harm than the resisting party does,
the prospect of success need not be great in order to get the preliminary
injun~tion.'~'
Hence, the curve comes close to the horizontal axis at its
outermost point.
B.

Personal Jurisdiction

In order to meet due process standards under the International Shoe
formula memorized by all first-year law students, personal jurisdiction
in a state court over an absent defendant depends on "certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial j~stice.'"'"~In
light of later cases,lo3it is clear that the International Shoe formula contains two elements: power of the forum state over the defendant or the
transaction (stemming from the defendant's or the transaction's minimum contacts with it), and fairness to the parties (traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice).'04
99. See 11A WRIGHTET AL., supra note 84, 5 2948.3. For a recent federal case applying
this approach without saying so, see Brenntag Int'l Chems., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245
(2d Cir. 1999). For examples of state court cases turning explicitly or de facto on a strong showings of prospective success on the merits, see 14859 Moorpark Homeowner's Ass'n v. VRT
Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417
(Del. 1988); Penn v. Transp. Lease Hawaii. Ltd., 630 P.2d 646 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. County of Suffolk, 418 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. 1981); Clark County School Dist. v.
Buchanan, 924 P.2d 716 (Nev. 1996). But see Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l
Football League. 634 F.2d 1197. 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "at least a minimal tip in
the balance of hardships must be found even when the strongest showing on the merits is maden).
Id.
100. See, e.g., St. Croix of Park Falls, Ltd. v. Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc., 2000 WL
1053961, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. July 31. 2000) (mem. opinion).
101. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 84, at 189-95; Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co.. 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)).
103. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California. 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla. 357
U.S. 235 (1958).
IN CIVIL ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL BASIS AND
104. Cf. 1 ROBERT C. CASAD,JURISDICTION
PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION OF STATEAND FEDERALCOURTS 5 2.05 (2d ed. 1991).
Casad says the two-part test consists of (1) purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum state (or purposeful contact with the forum state), and (2) overall fairness.
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The Due Process Clause is primarily a fairness check on what governmental units (including courts) may do to persons. But in certain
contexts, including jurisdiction to adjudicate, it also reflects a concern
that a governmental unit may try to arrogate to itself unseemly power.
In Hanson v. Denckla, the Supreme Court stressed this power element
in striking down Florida's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
Delaware trustee:
Those restrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts]
are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal
the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of
power over him.lo5
The majority in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson referred
to this passage with approval, and then struck down Oklahoma's assertion of personal jurisdiction over the absent east coast Audi regional
distributor and retail dealer primarily on power grounds.lo6 The majority in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court struck down California's assertion of personal jurisdiction in an indemnity proceeding
against a Japanese tire valve manufacturer on fairness (reasonableness)
grounds,lo7though there was a question about the legitimate assertion of
power as well.
H a n s o n , World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi were specificjurisdiction cases. That is, the state's assertion of jurisdiction over the
absent defendant in each of those cases depended on whether the claim
for relief arose out of (or perhaps whether it was sufficiently related to)
the absent defendant's activities within the state. Additionally, it is well
established that a state may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant
that has ongoing, relatively strong connections with the state, such as
domicile or a principal place of business there, even if the claim for
relief does not arise out of (or is not related to) activities in the state.'''
Id. The first is essentially a test to determine the legitimacy of the forum state's assertion of
power over the defendant; the second is self-explanatory. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws treats reasonableness (fairness) as an aspect of a state's power to exercise its judicial
(SECOND)OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS $8 35-52
jurisdiction over a defendant. See RESTATEMENT
(1971).
105. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (quoting Int'l Shoe. 326 U.S. at 319).
106. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
107. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U . S . at 113-16.
108. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV.L. REV. 1121 (1966); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77 (1980). Professor Bril-
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Professor William M. Richman has made a compelling case that the
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction is fuzzier than the
traditional analysis would have it.'"' He sees a sliding scale between the
extent of the defendant's contacts with the forum, on one hand, and the
relationship between the plaintiffs claim and the defendant's contacts
with the forum, on the other.ll0 Under this view, some cases that fit
neither the specific jurisdiction nor the general jurisdiction mold would
nevertheless fall within due process bounds for personal jurisdiction."'
There is indeed a sliding scale here, but it does not seem to be exactly as Professor Richman has articulated it. Rather, the sliding scale
in long-arm cases seems to be between cognizant contacts with the forum (as a measure of legitimacy of the forum's power to assert personal
jurisdiction over the absent defendant) and fair play toward the parties.
I have styled the first element "cognizant contacts" rather than Hanson
v. Denckla's "purposeful contacts" because, as a slightly broader test,
it can encompass general jurisdiction as well as specific jurisdiction
without doing violence to the Hanson formulation. The second element,
fair play, includes the degree to which the claim is related to the cognizant contacts, but also such things as the strength of the state's interest
in providing a forum for the plaintiff, reasonable statutory notice to
persons in the defendant's shoes that the forum regards them as subject
to its long-arm jurisdiction, any inconvenience to the defendant of
defending in the state, and any benefits the defendant has received from
sources in the forum state.ll2 Although Asahi is the only Supreme Court
case to say so, fair play also takes into account-or at least should take
into account- any likelihood that the forum would make a constitutionally-suspect, plaintiff-favoring choice of its own law if it hears the case
on the merits.'13
mayer justifies the accepted bases for state court jurisdiction in power (sovereignty) terms. Id. at
85-88.
supra note 3; see also Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,
109. See RICHMAN,
101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 663-64 (1988) (discussing a similar sliding scale); EUGENE F. SCOLES.
OF LAWS300 n.12 (3d ed. 2000) (citing cases but not endorsing their sliding
ET AL., CONFLICT
scale approach).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. These fair play factors go a long way toward determining whether the defendant could
have reasonably foreseen that it could be hailed into court in the forum state. See Shaffer v.
Heitner. 433 U.S. 186. 215-16 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 297. Some cases in
lower courts articulate these and other factors as separate elements of due process analysis.
rather than subsuming them under "fair play." See, e.g., Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB,
11 F.3d 1482. 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993).
113. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California. 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
Although the Supreme Court did not say so, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). was also
such a case. See Frederic L. Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in
L. REV. 94, 142-50 (1976). Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL
may also fall in this category.
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The diagram below illustrates all types of long-arm case in a state
court in the United States without regard to the accepted taxonomy that
distinguishes general jurisdiction from specific jurisdiction. It does not
illustrate transient jurisdiction cases like Burnham v. Superior Court,
where personal service within the state has been held to suffice without
regard to other contacts or to any case-specific evaluation of fairness.l14

ogn-mt
contacts

hi

Figure 5

I

I!

'

Personaljurisdiction OK

Fair play
Curve J-1 represents the case of the defendant who is either a citizen or resident of the United States, or of another country with a common law system. For such a defendant, any combination of cognizant
contacts and fair play that falls below curve J-1 would indicate a lack of
personal jurisdiction. Anything above curve J-1 would suffice for personal jurisdiction.
Curve 5-2 represents the case of the defendant who is a citizen and
resident of a non-common-law country and who does not have a headquarters or principal place of business in the United States. As will be
shown below, the Supreme Court has applied more stringent jurisdictional standards to protect such defendants; hence the curve for them is
to the right of the J-1 curve. For personal jurisdiction to be upheld in
114. 495

U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
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these cases, the intersection between cognizant contacts and fair play
would have to fall above curve 5-2.
Curve J-1 touches the vertical axis at point A. That point represents
the case against a defendant who is a domiciliary of the forum state or
which has its corporate headquarters or principal place of business
there. In other words, it is the classic general jurisdiction case, in
which the extensive contacts will suffice without any case-specific examination of factors (other than proper notice to the defendant) that
might go into a finding of fairness.
Neither of the J curves touches the horizontal axis. In other words,
there are cases in which the cognizant contacts are so minimal that no
assessment of fairness is needed in order to reject jurisdiction.
Point B reflects the combination of cognizant contacts and fair play
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. W~odson.''~
The purchaser of an
Audi from a retail dealer in New York drove it west, heading for a new
home in Arizona.'16 An accident in Oklahoma severely injured three
occupants of the car."' The ensuing products liability action was
brought in Oklahoma against the dealer and the New York regional distributor.'18 There was no evidence that any other car the defendant dis~
tributor or dealer sold had ever made its way to ~ k l a h o m a . " The
United States Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over the dealer or the d i s t r i b u t ~ r . ' ~ ~
Their cognizant contacts with Oklahoma, according to the record in the
case, were very near zero on the vertical axis. Justice Brennan's dissent
demonstrated that it would not have been terribly unfair to require them
to defend in Oklahoma, but that was not enough to bring point B above
the J-1 curve.12'
Point C illustrates Asahi. Asahi, a Japanese tire valve manufacturer,
sold valves to a Taiwanese tire manufacturer, which in turn shipped
tubes containing those valves to California.lu Asahi was aware that
tires with its valves were going to California.'" After an accident in
California allegedly caused by an explosion of a defective tire, the Taiwanese manufacturer was sued.lZ4 It sought indemnification from
Asahi.lZ5 Asahi contested personal juri~diction.'~~
Four Justices con115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

444 U.S. 286 (1980).
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 291.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987).
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 106.
Id.
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cluded that by placing its valves in the stream of commerce leading to
California, Asahi had significant contacts with that state.'" A fifth, Justice Stevens, clearly indicated that he thought so too.lZ8The cognizant
contacts thus may be plotted rather far up the vertical axis. But the fair
play factors were weak. It was inconvenient for Asahi to defend in
California. More importantly, California was asking Asahi to bear
"unique burdens" by defending itself in an unfamiliar foreign legal system-a factor the majority said "should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness" (fairness) of California's assertion of longarm jurisdi~tion.'~~
Moreover, the interests of the remaining plaintiff in
the case (the Taiwanese tire manufacturer suing for indemnification)
and of California in trying the case there were said to be slight.130 TO
top it off, California would surely apply its own (generous) indemnification law to the merits-a constitutionally suspect choice of law under
the circumstances. 13'
The resulting combination of fair play and cognizant contacts-point
C-is below the J-2 curve. But point C is above the J-1 curve, indicating that if the defendant had been an American or Canadian company,
or had its headquarters or principal place of business in the United
States, personal jurisdiction over it probably would have been upheld.
Not only would the sliding scale curve be lowered to J-1, but also the
greater familiarity of the defendant with the forum's legal system would
have pushed point C to the right.13'
Points D and E also fall between the two curves, but they illustrate
opposite results. Point D depicts Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v.
which involved a Colombian defendant in a Texas
court, while point E represents Burger King,'34 where the defendant in
federal district court in Florida was a Michigan resident.
In Helicopteros, Helicol was a Colombian company with its principal place of business in Bogoti.13' It provided helicopter services in
Peru for a Peruvian consortium pursuant to a contract partially negotiated in Texas, but signed in Peru.'36 Payments under the contract were

126. Id.
127. Id. at I l l .
128. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
129. Id. at 114.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 115.
132. See Aristech Chem. Int'l Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 628-29 (6th
Cir. 1998). cited with approval in SCOLES.supra note 109. at 309.
133. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
134. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
135. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409.
136. Id. at 410.
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to be made to Helicol's account with a bank in New York City.137Helicol had purchased most of its helicopters in Texas, had sent its prospective pilots to Texas for training, and had sent management and maintenance personnel to Texas for technical consultation^.'^^ It had no other
business contacts with Texas.'3g
In an action by the survivors and representatives of four United
States citizens who died when one of Helicol's helicopters crashed in
Peru while performing the contract, the United States Supreme Court
The plainheld that Texas lacked general jurisdiction over Helic01.'~~
tiffs had conceded that special jurisdiction did not exist on the facts.14'
Apparently, the plaintiffs also failed to argue that long-arm jurisdiction
might be based on a hybrid category falling somewhere between traditional general and special jurisdiction.
Helicol had enough cognizant contacts with Texas to position the
case part way up on the vertical axis, and they bore enough relation to
the claim for relief to extend partially out on the horizontal axis. Professor Richman, without addressing the significance of Helicol's foreignness, has argued that the extent of Helicol's contacts with Texas,
combined with the relationship of the plaintiffs' claim to those contacts,
should have been enough to uphold Texas' long-arm j~risdicti0n.l~~
So
they should, if Helicol had been incorporated in the United States or
had its headquarters or principal place of business in the United States.
Hence point D is above the J-1 curve.
The Supreme Court in Helicopteros did not mention Helicol's foreignness except in its statement of the facts,143so one cannot be sure
whether the foreignness would have defeated jurisdiction if the plaintiff
had argued all possible bases of long-arm jurisdiction. The reason the
Supreme Court did not dwell on Helicol's foreignness probably was
because, on the theory of the case presented to it (orthodox general
jurisdiction), the traditional focus is on only one of the two usual factors-the cognizant contacts with the forum. Had the Court focused as
well on fair play, it probably still would have denied jurisdiction. In
effect, it would have applied the J-2 curve because of the hardship to
the South American defendant in defending this wrongful death action
in the United States. It is also relevant that the jury in Texas had
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.
Helicopreros. 466 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 415. Bur see id. at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J.. dissenting). Brennan expressed his disagreement with the Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs had conceded a lack of special jurisdiction. Id.
142. See Richman, supra note 3, at 1338-40.
143. See Helicopreros. 466 U.S. at 409-10.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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awarded the plaintiffs more than a million dollars in damage~'~~-a
staggering sum by South American juridical standards.
In Burger King, Rudzewicz, an individual in Michigan, obtained a
franchise from Burger King, a Florida corporation with its principal
place of business in Miami, to operate a fast food restaurant in a suburb
of Detroit.14' Although most or all of the franchise negotiations were
conducted through Burger King's Birmingham, Michigan, district office, Rudzewicz knew he was obtaining a franchise from a company
based in F10rida.I~~
His partner attended management courses in Miami,
and the two of them purchased equipment from a Burger King affiliate
in Florida.14' The twenty-year franchise agreement provided that payments were to be made to Burger King in Miami, and contained a
choice-of-law clause selecting Florida 1aw.l4'
When Rudzewicz and his partner fell far behind in their payments,
Burger King terminated the franchise and sued them in federal district
court in Florida, basing federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship
and seeking damages for breach of contract.149The Supreme Court upheld the district court's long-arm jurisdiction over Rudzewicz despite
his paucity of physical contacts with Florida."O
Rudzewicz and his partner did, however, have one important contact with Florida-they initiated the effort to obtain a long-term franchise from the Florida company.151 More significant to the Supreme
Court majority, though, was the fair play element. Speaking through
Justice Breman, the majority used a sliding scale: "[Fair play] considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction
upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be
required.
Because Rudzewicz and his partner had signed a long-term contract
binding them to deal closely with Burger King at its Miami headquarters, and had agreed in the contract that any disputes would be governed by Florida law, the majority said that Rudzewicz could reasonably foresee possible litigation there.153This amounted to a conclusion
that there was a substantial degree of fairness in allowing Burger King
Id. at 412.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464-66 (1985).
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 466-67.
Id.
Id. at 480-82.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 487.
Burger King, 471 U.S at 466.
Id. at 477 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984)); see also Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
144.
145.
14.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

223-24 (1957).
153. Burger King. 471 U.S. at 480-81.
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to haul Rudzewicz into court in Burger King's home state. It was just
enough to place point E above the J-1 curve.
Had Rudzewicz been, let us say, a Philippine small business person
dealing with Burger King from Manila, it is doubtful that the Supreme
Court would have allowed a court in Florida to assert personal jurisdiction over him. The jurisdiction curve would have shifted outward to J2.
Figure 5 does not attempt to chart Shaffer v. Heitner,lS4 another
leading Supreme Court case, but it could be incorporated into the diagram. The holder of one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation,
a Delaware company, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in a Delaware court against nonresident officers and directors for violation of
their fiduciary duties to the corporati~n.'~'Jurisdiction was based on a
Delaware statute that allowed sequestration of any property in Delaware
of an absent defendant and sale of the property to satisfy any judgment.'" Stock in a Delaware corporation was considered to have a
Delaware situs for purposes of the ~tatute.'~'A defendant would have to
enter a general appearance in order to defend on the rnerits.ls8 Statutory
quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer was thus obtained over those nonresident officers and directors who owned any stock at all in the Greyhound Corporati~n.'~~
The Supreme Court struck down the Delaware statute insofar as it
subjected nonresident defendants to quasi in rem jurisdiction based simply on the artificial situs of their stockholdings in Delaware corporations, and held that the International Shoe standard should be applied to
such cases.16" In the view of the majority, there were no cognizant contacts ("Appellants have simply had nothing to do with the State of
Delaware"),16' and it was unfair to assert jurisdiction over defendants
who "had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court."'62
In other words, the point of intersection between cognizant contacts and
fair play would be virtually at the intersection of the horizontal and
vertical axes.
It strains credulity to say that the defendants, who knowingly became officers and directors of a Delaware corporation, "simply had
nothing to do with the State of D e l a ~ a r e . " 'Nevertheless,
~~
even if their
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
10.
161.
162.
163.

433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 189.
Id.
Id. at 192.
See id.
Id.
Sltaffer. 433 U.S. at 216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cognizant contacts moved them a short distance up the vertical axis, the
intersection between cognizant contacts and fair play presumably would
still be below the J-1 curve under the Delaware long-arm statute in
force at the time of Shaffer. Very shortly after Shaffer was decided,
however, Delaware enacted a long-arm statute for violation of a nonresident director's fiduciary duties, basing jurisdiction on the director's
position with the Delaware corporation, rather than on stockholdings in
it.'@ Thus Delaware addressed the unfairness point stressed by the majority in Shaffer, at least as to corporate directors. That moves the fair
play point on the horizontal axis far to the right, probably enough to
place the intersection between cognizant contacts and fair play above
the J-1 curve. Under the current Delaware statute, the case should come
out the other way as to the (American) defendants who were directors. 165

IV.

CONFLICT OF LAWSISSUES(OTHER THAN LONGARM
JURISDICTION)
A.

Change of Domicile

Figure 6 , below, is a modified version of Figure 1, with two domicile curves instead of one. The D-1 curve represents the genre that
tends to appear in appellate court reports, where the change-of-domicile
issue determines which state's law governs devolution of movables at
death,166or determines whether the defendant in a civil suit is subject to
the forum's long-arm jurisdiction.I6' Any combination of physical presence in the new state and demonstrated resolve to stay that falls outside
the D-1 curve (for example, at point A) will establish the change of
residence in such cases-in fact, in all cases, since the D-1 curve is the
more demanding of the two for a change of domicile.
The D-2 curve illustrates the less stringent application of the standard factors when the change of domicile is being considered only for
such things as the right to vote or to register a car in the new state.
Statutes sometimes use "residence" instead of "domicile" for such purposes, and the change in terminology may denote a legislative intent to
apply a less exacting standard. On the other hand, it has been observed
164. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, 5 3114 (Michie 1999).
165. See id. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the statute in Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423
A.2d 174 (Del. 1980).
166. The law of the decedent's domicile at death normally determines intestate succession to
movables, and the validity and effect of the decedent's will insofar as it applies to moveables.
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS$8 260,263 (1971).
167. See id. 5 29; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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that "residence" is often used synonymously with " d ~ m i c i l e . " ' ~ ~
Whether the D-2 curve is regarded as a change-of-residence curve or a
limited change-of-domicile curve is of little significance. A combination
of fairly substantial presence without much demonstrated resolve to
make a long-term home in the new state, as at point C in the case of an
eighteen-year-old student attending college outside the state of his or
her upbringing, would suffice for voting or car registration purposes.
The D-2 curve could change shape somewhat, depending on the purpose for which "domicile" or "residence" is being used. For example,
it presumably would shift somewhat to the right if the issue is whether
the plaintiff may bring divorce proceedings in the new state, rather than
whether she may register a car there.I6'
Figure 6

Extent of
physical
presence
in new
state

Domicile changed

Extent of demonstrated resolve to move
In Figure 6, the D-1 curve approaches the horizontal axis more
closely than it does the vertical axis. The reason is that, for such things
as administration of estates, the extent of demonstrated resolve to remain in the new state often outweighs the extent of physical presence
168. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS5 11 cmt. k (1971); Willis L. M.
Reese & Robert S. Green, That Elusive Word. "Residence." 6 VAND.L. REV.561, 561 (1953).
169. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11). 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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there. A clearly demonstrated resolve to remain may well carry the day
without much physical presence, but even an extended physical presence will not translate into a change of domicile unless there is more
than a minimal showing of intent to stay.
Point A in Figure 6 illustrates In re Estate of El~on.'~'The decedent, Natalie Elson, had lived her entire life in Illinois until she traveled to Pennsylvania to study horsemanship and to work for a year on a
horse farm.17' There was some evidence that she planned to return to
Illinois at the end of the year.172She took her horse and most of her
personal belongings to Pennsylvania, leaving her jewelry and some
other items in storage in 1llin0is.l~~
She opened bank accounts in Delaware, just across the Pennsylvania line, and said in an unmailed letter
that she had moved to Penn~y1vania.l~~
Six days after she arrived in
Pennsylvania, she was killed in an automobile accident.17'
The trial court in Illinois held that Elson had become a Pennsylvania domiciliary for purposes of issuing letters of administration of her
estate, and the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed.176She had neither
demonstrated a clear resolve to move permanently to Pennsylvania nor
established a longstanding physical presence, but the combination of
some demonstrated intent to move permanently, clear evidence of her
commitment to stay at least a year, and six days' presence was enough
to convince the Illinois court that she had changed her domicile to
Pennsylvania.ln
Point B represents the combination of physical presence and demonstrated resolve to stay in the new state in the well-known case of White
v. ~ennant.'~'Michael White sold his West Virginia farm and left with
his wife and livestock for a house in Pennsylvania, just across the West
Virginia state line.'" The house was part of a large family tract that
spanned the state line."' Michael had declared his intent to move into
the Pennsylvania house and to make it his home.'''
He and his wife arrived about dusk, unloaded their household goods
and turned loose the livestock, but found the house damp and uncom-

N.E.2d 637 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
In re Elson, 458 N.E.2d at 640.
Id.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 640.
Id.
In re Elson, 458 N.E.2d at 643.
See id.
458

8 S.E. 596 (W.Va. 1888).
Whire, 8 S.E. at 598.

Id.
Id.
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fortable.18' Michael's wife, Lucinda, was feeling ill, so they accepted
his siblings' invitation to spend the night at the mansion house on the
West Virginia side of the border.lg3 Lucinda, it turned out, had developed typhoid fever.184Michael remained with her in the West Virginia
mansion house, going daily to the Pennsylvania land to care for his
livestock.185Lucinda recovered, but Michael contracted typhoid fever
and died.
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that Michael had adequately
demonstrated his resolve to move to Pennsylvania, even though he had
not slept there a single night.I8' Consequently, his personal estate would
Presumably, if
be distributed according to the law of ~ennsy1vania.I~~
Michael had stopped at the West Virginia mansion house because of
Lucinda's illness before they had gotten to Pennsylvania and had never
crossed the border before he died, point B would have fallen below the
D-1 curve (and he would have been held not to have changed his domicile), even though his demonstrated resolve to move to Pennsylvania
still would have been plotted rather far out on the horizontal axis.
Point C illustrates In re Estate of get.^.'^' The decedent and his wife
retired from Pennsylvania to Florida in 1984.1g0He registered to vote in
Florida, obtained a driver's license, bought land and built a house
there.lgl His wife and he lived in the Florida house, but spent the summer months back in Pennsylvania at his wife's family farm.lg2 In 1988,
he executed a will in which he said that he was "of Zion Grove,
Schuylkill County, ~ennsylvania."Ig3 He died in 1990 in Florida.lg4The
Pennsylvania court held that, for purposes of appointment of an executor of his estate, he died a Pennsylvania domiciliary.lg5 His will had
cast doubt on his resolve to move permanently to Florida, so his rather
well-established presence there was not enough to change his domicile.'% For purposes of voting and obtaining a driver's license, however, the combination of physical presence and demonstrated resolve to

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
White. 8 S.E. at 598.
Id.
Id.
Id. at GOO.
Id.
611 A.2d 778 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1992).
Estate of Getz, 611 A.2d at 781.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 779.
Esrare of Getz. 611 A.2d at 780.
Id. at 782.
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move was enough.lg7The intersection is to the right of the D-2 curve.

B.

Choice of Law in Tort and Contract Cases

Ever since Walter Wheeler Cooklg8and Brainerd C ~ r r i ebegan
' ~ ~ to
challenge Joseph Beale's mechanical, jurisdiction-selecting approach to
choice of law, courts and academics have been struggling to find a new
system or systems that will produce principled decisions that take account of the policies underlying conflicting, potentially-applicable laws.
Under Beale's rigid approach, the decision-maker facing a choice of
law problem was supposed to characterize the issue, apply a predetermined connecting factor to that characterization, and be led inexorably
to the law of a particular state or c o ~ n t r y . ' For
~ torts the connecting
factor was the "place of wrong;" for validity of contracts it was the
"place of contracting. "201
Professor Beale's approach did not lend itself to a sliding scale. But
he is no longer in vogue, and today only a relatively small minority of
states retains his system in tort and contract case^."^ The dominant
method in these cases now focuses ostensibly on the law of the state
with the most significant relationship to the occurrence (or the transaction) and the parties-the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (hereinafter Second ~estatement)."~Some "modern"
states eschew both Restatements and use Currie's interest analysis or
Robert Leflar's combined interest analysislbetter rule of law approa~h.''~And the notorious laundry list of relevant factors in section 6
of the Second Restatement is so flexible that courts using it often approximate the approaches of Currie, Leflar or some combination of the
-

-

-

-

197. Id. at 781.
W. COOK,THE LOGICAL
A N D LEGAL BASESOF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
198. See WALTER
passim (1942).
CURRIE
SELECTED
,
ESSAYSO N T H ECONFLICT
OF LAWSpassim (1963).
199. See BRAINERD
O N T H ECONFLICT
OF LAWSpassim (1935). Profes200. See 2 JOSEPH H . BEALE,A TREATISE
sor Beale was the Reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, which embodied his
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS
jurisdiction-selecting approach throughout. See RESTATEMENT
passim (1934).
201. See BEALE,supra note 200, 8 s 311.1, 390.1.
202. See Symeon C . Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As the
Century Turns, 49 A M . J . C O M PL.
. 1, 2 (2001) (showing which states use each choice-of-law
method in tort and contract cases).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $8 145, 188 (1971).
204. See Symeonides, supra note 202, at 13.
205. The laundry list applies when there is no applicable statutory directive. It includes:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of
justified expectations. (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determina-
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Scholars have devoted reams of paper to devising the best possible
policy-oriented choice-of-law system for tort and contract cases. That is
not the concern here. The focus instead is on what factors predominantly influence "modern" courts' actual choices of law in tort and contract cases-on whether the courts use a sliding scale in applying them,
and if they do appear to use a sliding scale, on how it operates in practice.
Professor Leflar was a pioneer in identifying factors courts actually
use for choice of law. He identified five factors, not all of which would
be significant in every case: (a) predictability of results, (b) maintenance of interstate and international order, (c) simplification of the judicial task, (d) advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and
(e) application of the better rule of law.'06 Each of these, except possibly the last one, has a counterpart in section 6 of the second- estatement.'07
Leflar not only identified the "better rule of law" as a factor operating in actual cases, but also advocated its explicit use.208Some state
courts of last resort now do
But, in tort cases at least, those
courts do not seem to reach results that vary significantly from the results reached by courts using any other "modern" approach. All of the
"modem" approaches show a propensity to favor forum law.210They
also tend to apply the law that favors re~overy.~"In practice, that is
usually the forum's law because the plaintiff chooses the forum and will
select one that promises recovery if jurisdiction may be obtained over
the defendant.
Often, of course, the forum will be the plaintiff's home state. When
this is so, the forum will have an interest in applying its recoveryfavoring rule. Even if the forum is not the plaintiff's home state, it will
sometimes have other policies (such as protecting local medical creditors in a personal injury case) that would be effectuated by applying its
own law. In Professor Currie's interest analysis terms, the forum is an
interested state in these cases, and should apply its own law unless
tion and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS8 6 (1971).
206. Robert A. Leflar. Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations. 54 CAL.
L. REV. 1584. 1585-88(1966).
207. Even the last one-the better rule of law-arguably is a sharpened version of section
6(2)(e): the basic policies underlying the particular field of law.
208. Leflar, supra note 206, at 1588.
209. Symeonides, supra note 202, at 13. Symeonides identifies Arkansas, Minnesota, New
Hampshire. Rhode Island and Wisconsin as states using the "better rule of law" approach in tort
cases, with Minnesota and Wisconsin using it also in contract cases. Id.
210. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 357. 377 (1992).
211. Id. at 378, 380.

454

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 53:2:421

there is a good reason not to. By definition, if the other state has no
interest in applying its law, there is a false conflict and forum law will
prevail. Even if the other state has an interest in applying its law, or if
neither state has an interest, Currie would favor application of forum
law in most cases.212
To say that the forum has an interest in applying its own law when,
for example, it favors a forum plaintiff, is not to say that its interest is
equally strong in all such cases. Thus, if the relevant forum policy is
tailored to a particularly vulnerable class of persons and the injured
forum plaintiff is in that class, the forum's interest may be greater than
if a more general compensatory policy is at stake. If the forum's protective policy could be effectuated reasonably well in some way other
than by providing tort recovery for the forum plaintiff, its interest in
allowing recovery at the expense of defeating some other state's policy
may not be strong-though it would still exist in some measure.'13
Clearly, there are degrees of forum interest in applying its own law,
ranging from no interest to intense interest. Forum interest is another
example of a fuzzy set.
Courts are loathe to defeat a party's reasonable expectations, especially when he or she has relied on the expectations. They are as loathe
to do so when faced with a choice of law problem as they are in other
situations.214Whenever factors relevant to choice of law are listed, protection of reasonable expectations is included.215Moreover, protection
of expectations underlies some rules or approaches, such as the preference for selecting the law of validation in contract validity disputes,216
that are not couched expressly in terms of expectations.
Obviously, expectations play a far more important role in contract
cases than in most tort cases, but they can be significant in some tort
cases too-as when a person molds his or her conduct to a specific
212.

See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method.
227, 261-62 (1958).
213. Currie acknowledged that the forum's interest was not all or nothing. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third Stare, 28 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS. 754. 757 (1963) (conceding that
in some true conflict cases, the forum should re-examine the situation and apply a "moderate and
restrained interpretation" of its own policy and of its interest in applying its policy to the case at
hand). "Comparative impairment," as a method for resolving true conflicts, is based on the
perception that a state's interest in applying its own law often is not absolute. See William F.
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1963). California uses
comparative impairment as a true conflict tie-breaker. See Bernhard v . Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d
719, 723-27 (Cal. 1976).
214. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS5 6, cmt. g (1971).
215. See. e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 8 6(d) (1971); LUTHER L.
MCDOUGAL 111 ET AL., AMERICAN
CONFLICTS
LAW5 94 (5th ed. 2001); cf. DAVIDF. CAVERS,
THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS 189-96 (1965).
216. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG. A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICTOF LAWS $5 175-185
(1962); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS$5 7.2-7.4(d) (4th

25 U.

CHI. L. REV.

ed. 2001).
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standard of care in the place of conduct, or when the owner of an
automobile lends it to another without being able to foresee that the
latter will drive it to another state with an especially broad rule of liability.''' Expectations have even been given significant weight when
they go no further than a general belief that a person's conduct in his
home state will be judged by that state's law, no matter where the injured visitor may reside.*18 Whenever legitimate expectations may be
defeated by application of one state's law, decision-makers will take
them into account in the choice-of-law process. And expectations, like
state interests, are matters of degree. Expectations embodied in a
freely-negotiated written contract that is shaped to the law of a particular state, will normally be very strongly held;219but an expectation that
an accident in state X will be governed by the law of state X may be
only vaguely held, and in any event may not shape the conduct of the
person who has the accident.
Even those courts that use defined elements such as those in section
6 of the Second Restatement, do not normally identify as the dominant
factors the extent of the forum's interest in applying its own law and
the extent to which that would defeat the losing party's expectations.
For these reasons, any attempt to identify two key factors or elements
in choice of law cases must be undertaken with some diffidence. Nevertheless, the two factors discussed above-forum preference and protection of reasonable expectations-have enough explanatory and predictive value in torts and contracts choice of law cases to be singled out,
and there seems to be a sliding scale between them. They are more important explanatory or predictive elements than Leflar's "better law,"
because they identify key factors that are likely to shape a court's selection of a "better law." That is, the better law usually will coincide with
forum law (in the eyes of the forum) unless application of forum law
would defeat or seriously impair a party's reasonable expectations.
The two dominant elements interact in tort and contract cases as indicated in Figure 7, subject to one caveat. In the rare tort or contract
cases in which the forum has no recognizable interest in applying its
own law (because the case presents a false conflict in favor of the nonforum state or country) the model does not work. Nor does it work
217. See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942. 944 (2d Cir. 1934); Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (N.Y. 1985); Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc.,
612 N.E.2d 277,283-84 (N.Y. 1993).
218. See Baedke v. John Morrell & Co., 748 F. Supp. 700, 704 (N.D. Iowa 1990); Casey v.
Manson Constr. & Eng'g Co.. 428 P.2d 898, 906 (Or. 1967).
219. This is particularly so if the contract contains a choice-of-law clause. The Second Restatement takes some pains to uphold such clauses if it is at all reasonable to do so. See
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS5 187 (1971).
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predictably in an "unprovided-for case" in which neither state is interested in applying its own law. These are rare cases because, as noted
above, plaintiffs choose forums favorable to themselves, and even if the
plaintiff is a nonresident, the court may well find (or may construct) an
applicable forum policy, such as a concern that people who come into
the state to litigate should have their cases adjudicated under the forum's concepts of justice.*0 That would turn an apparently-false conflict into a true conflict (or would turn an apparently-unprovided-for
case into a false conflict in favor of the forum), and would fit the
model.
For reasons to be explained below, the curve in Figure 7 resembles
an economist's supply curve rather than a demand curve.
Figure 7
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The diagram assumes that the expectations are reasonable ones.
Thus, for example, expectations based on an irrational delusion would
220. See Leflar, supra note 206, at 1594, cited with approval in Milkovich v. Saari, 203
N.W.2d 408, 412-17 (Minn. 1973) (applying forum recovery rule rather than Ontario guest
statute when Ontario residents had an accident in the forum while on a short trip there).
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not count (or could be placed at the point of origin on the horizontal
axis). The vertical axis measures the extent of the forum's interest in
the sense used in interest analysis; to measure it, one would have to
identify the policy (or policies) underlying the particular rule of forum
law and then determine how interested the forum is in applying the policy to the facts at hand. Unlike the curves in Figures l through 6 , the
curve in Figure 7 begins on the horizontal axis and proceeds northeast.
The area above the curve, where the court is likely to choose forum
law, is far greater than the area below it, where the court is likely to
choose another state or country's law. The odds that forum law will not
be chosen increase exponentially as the resisting party's level of reasonable frustration (were forum law to be selected) grows beyond a
minimal level. But at, or quite near, the point of origin on the horizontal axis, where expectations are nonexistent or inconsequential, the forum may be inclined to apply its own law even if it has little or no interest in doing so-even if the matter before it is an unprovided-for case
in which neither state has an interest in applying its own law."'
In Figure 7, point A illustrates the classic false conflict in favor of
the forum, such as occurred in Babcock v. ~ a c k s o n . 'Two
~ ~ New Yorkers took an automobile trip to Ontario, where they had an accident.223
Ontario had a guest statute that would have precluded the plaintiff-guest
from recovering against the driver, but New York had no guest stat~ t e New
. ~ York
~ applied its own law.w It had a very strong interest in
applying its compensatory policy to a case in which the only parties
were New Yorkers, and to do so did not frustrate anyone's reasonable
expectations, or if it did, the degree of frustration was minimal.
Point B represents Lilienthal v. Ka~fman."~The defendant, a Californian, lent money in California to an Oregonian who had previously
been declared a spendthrift by an Oregon court, thus rendering his obligations voidable under Oregon law."' The obligation was enforceable
under California law."' The California creditor was unaware that the
borrower had been declared a spendthrift in Oregon, and apparently
221. See Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973) (applying the forum's own law without
frustrating anyone's reasonable expectations in an unprovided-for case). Bur see Nodak Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2000) (applying the other state's law.
again without frustrating anyone's reasonable expectations in an unprovided-for case). As has
already been pointed out, the model does not apply to a false conflict in favor of the non-forum
state.
222. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
223. Babcock. 191 N.E.2d at 280.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 285.
226. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
227. See Lilenthal, 395 P.2d at 545.
228. Id.
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made some efforts to check his credit rating without discovering that
crucial fact.ug When the Californian sued the spendthrift in Oregon to
recover on a dishonored check the spendthrift had given him to pay off
the loan, the Oregon court recognized the true conflict and agonized
over the proper result, but finally chose Oregon law to defeat the
claim.*' The court's choice thus completely frustrated the Californian's
reasonable expectations, but the Oregon interest in protecting the
spendthrift's family and the Oregon public fisc was sufficiently strong
to bring point B just above the curve.231
Point C illustrates Bernkrant v. F ~ w l e r . " The
~ plaintiffs were Nevada residents who owed one Granrud $24,000 for the purchase of a
Nevada b~ilding.*~At a meeting in Las Vegas, Granrud told them he
would forgive in his will any debt remaining at his death if the plaintiffs would make an immediate partial payment.u4 Plaintiffs made the
partial payment, but Granrud did not forgive the remaining debt.*' He
died a California resident. It was not apparent whether he had been a
Californian all along or whether he had moved there after the Las Vegas meeting.*6 His promise was unenforceable under the California
statute of frauds, but was enforceable under Nevada law."7 The California Supreme Court held that even if Granrud had been a Californian
all along, California would protect the plaintiffs' reasonable expectations and eschew the application of its own statute of frauds.u8
Bernkrant fell rather far to the right on the horizontal axis, though
not all the way because of the possibility that Granrud was (and was
known to be) a Californian at the time of the transaction. But the case
did not rise very far on the vertical axis because California had an alternate means of preventing any fraudulent claim against Granrud's
estate. The purpose of a trial is to ferret out the accurate facts. The
plaintiffs still had the burden of proving the oral promise. Any reasonably strong suspicion of fraud on their part could be brought out at trial
229. Id. at 544.
230. Id. at 549.
231. The court mentioned that in Olshen v. Kaufman, 385 P.2d 161 (Or. 1963). a case decided a year earlier involving an Oregon creditor and the same spendthrift, it had decided in
favor of the spendthrift. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 543-44. The disinclination to favor a nonresident
creditor over a resident creditor may have caused the court to embellish the Oregon interest just
enough to push it above the curve. Professor Cavers regarded Lilienthal as wrongly decided if,
as apparently was the case, the California creditor checked Kaufman's credit and found nothing
supra note 216, at 467 (treating
wrong. CAVERS,supra note 215, at 191-92; cf. WEINTRAUB,
unfair surprise as an overlooked issue in the case).
232. 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961).
233. Berkrant, 360 P.2d at 907.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 910.
237. Id. at 908.
238. Bernkrant, 360 P.2d at 910.
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even without Grandrud's testimony, and could defeat their claim without the aid of the statute of frauds.
Point D exemplifies Bernhard v. Harrah's Club.u9The plaintiff, a
Californian, suffered severe injuries when an automobile driven by
Fern Myers, also a Californian, collided with his motorcycle in California as Ms. Myers was driving back from an evening at Harrah's
Club in Nevada.240Ms. Myers was intoxicated at the time.241The plaintiff sued Harrah's Club for damages, claiming that the club proximately
caused his injuries by continuing to serve alcoholic beverages to Ms.
Myers after she was obviously int~xicated.~~'
California imposed liability on tavern keepers for such conduct, but Nevada did not.243At the
time of the incident, though, Nevada imposed criminal penalties for
serving liquor to an intoxicated person.24"The California policy was to
protect members of the public from harm by imposing a duty of care on
tavern keepers; the Nevada policy was to preclude tavern keepers from
being exposed to ruinous liability every time they served drinks.245The
California Supreme Court resolved the true conflict by using a comparative impairment approach; the California policy would suffer
greater impairment if Nevada law were applied than the Nevada policy
would if California law were applied, so the court chose California
California had a strong interest in applying its own law. The injured
plaintiff was a Californian and the intoxicated driver was endangering
safety on the California highways. Many Californians travel to nearby
Nevada gambling establishments and some of them could be expected to
drive home after consuming some alcoholic beverages. Consequently,
the risk of accidents in California from drunk driving emanating in Nevada was substantial and might be reduced by applying California's
compensatory rule; therefore, point D is high on the vertical axis. It is
only part way out on the horizontal axis because Harrah's Club is near
the California border, and it advertises regularly in California; thus,
Harrah's Club officials could foresee that intoxicated Californians
might drive back to California while still under the influence. Moreover, Harrah's Club would not have expected that serving alcoholic
beverages to obviously-intoxicated patrons would be risk-free since that
conduct was criminal in Nevada at the time of the incident. But if the
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976).
Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 721, 725.
Bernhard. 546 P.2d 725.
Id. at 725-26.
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defendant had been a small bar in Reno that did no advertising in California, point D would have been further to the right on the horizontal
axis and lower on the vertical axis, bringing it below the curve. Even
though tavern keeper liability cases like Bernhard are tort cases, the
reasonable expectations of the defendant can play a significant role.
Another California tort case, Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
CO.,~~'
fits nicely into Figure 7. The Vice-President of a California corporation went to a business meeting at the defendant's premises in Louisiana, where he was injured through the negligence of the defendant."'
A recent Louisiana case had held that a corporate plaintiff had no cause
of action for such an injury to a key empl~yee."~The California Supreme Court assumed for purposes of the case that a corporate employer would have a civil remedy against a tortfeasor under a provision
of the California Civil Code of 1872.250Nevertheless, it found that the
1872 statute was archaic and rarely applied, so California's interest in
applying it to this case was slight.=' On the other hand, the Louisiana
defendant "would most reasonably have anticipated a need for the protection of premises' liability insurance based on Louisiana law."252
Consequently, the California court chose Louisiana
Like Bernkrant v. ~ o w l e rthe
, ~ case
~ fell at point C in Figure 7.
Choice-of-law clauses in contracts provide another illustration. A
contract containing a clause selecting a validating non-forum law would
fall very near the right end of the horizontal axis, at least if the clause
is not simply boilerplate in an adhesion contract. The curve slants
sharply upward just before it reaches its right extremity, indicating that
in these cases it is quite likely that such a clause will be upheld. Only if
the result thus reached would run counter to a strong forum public policy that applies to the facts at hand (placing the case high on the vertical axis) would forum law override the parties' expectation^.^^

Fuzzy logic is at-large in the law. At least in the situations exam247. 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978).
248. Offshore Rental, 583 P.2d at 723.
249. Id. at 724.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 729.
252. Id.
253. Offshore Rental, 583 P.2d at 729.
254. 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961).
255. The Second Restatement would apply the invalidating fundamental policy of a state with
a materially greater interest than the chosen state, even if the more interested state were not the
forum. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS5 187(2)(b) (1971). It would be unusual.
though, if a forum found that any state except itself had such a materially greater interest. Cf.
EHRENZWEIG. supra note 216. 5 183.
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ined in this Article, seemingly distinct elements of legal formulae are
interrelated. It is not helpful to think of an element as either being met
or not met, in most cases. It will be met (or not met) to a degree. It
will be an unusual case when the degree equals one (i.e., loo%), and
perhaps only a little less unusual when it equals zero.
When two elements need to be met in order to satisfy a legal formula, the outcome is determined by the relationship between the degrees to which each element is met. The more fully one is met, the less
filly the other need be. This sliding scale can be illustrated by a curve,
or in some instances by more than one curve, between a horizontal and
a vertical axis. The slope and position of each curve will vary, depending on the issue to be resolved by the formula. This is not a precise
exercise, but it can be done with enough accuracy to supply insights
into what courts and other decision-makers are doing-whether they say
so or not. Consequently, it is useful in predicting the outcomes of future cases where dual-element legal formulas are at work.
The sliding scale theorem also illustrates a significant feature of the
legal process: judges and lawyers are inclined to speak in terms of absolutes (there either is or is not a likelihood of irreparable harm in a
preliminary injunction situation), but the absolutes become relative
when they are applied to resolving disputes arising from the untidy
compartments of human and institutional
Strict rules tend to
become malleable standards. The two-element formula provides one
example of how that process can operate.

256. I would argue that there indeed are absolutes in the realm of ethics or morality, but that
is a different matter from the resolution of disputes over temporal matters.

